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Abstract 
The current Chinese trade expansion brings benefit to many parties, both outside and 
inside the Chinese Mainland. It also poses huge challenges to others, in foreign countries,  
also in China. The event is important for its own sake, but also what it implies when rapid 
growth happens to countries large in population and size (including India, Russia, Brazil). 
It has to be understood in context. Conventional wisdom in economics and popular 
explanations cannot explain Chinese growth, let alone its implications. Only with suitable 
adaptations of what the economic discipline has to offer, can one assess the nature of 
what we observe and the policy measures needed for today.   
Like other episodes after Industrial Revolution, the late industrialization in China also 
relies on outside technology, often gained through trade and foreign investment. Because 
of the de-colonization after 1945, such growth can succeed even with scanty domestic 
resource. Like other East Asian economies, participation in cross border supply chains 
along its neighbors offers China an effective entrée.  
What makes China different from the other East Asian economies is size. The 
presence of a huge labor reserve keeps wage down, profit up, attracts foreign investment 
coming with technology, but may also lead to deteriorated terms of trade and income 
inequality at home, de-industrialization and the loss of development opportunities abroad, 
also resource shortage and environment damage, some of these are irreversible in nature. 
Over all, the development is the result of efficiency gain, which is basically desirable. 
It takes international cooperation to steer such development toward mutually beneficial 
paths. It is also desirable for China to accelerate job creation at home and avoid 
irreversible environment harm. These are well recognized by Chinese decision makers. 
More can be done. 1. Introduction 
The recent expansion of the Chinese trade is the focus of attention worldwide, in 
chancelleries, academia and the street. As a researcher of trade and East Asian 
development, but not the Chinese economy, I focus on the impact of China on worldwide 
growth and  development. The basis of my discussion will be contextual, with the 
emphasis on the general perspective, rather than special knowledge. 
The main discussion, written for brevity, comes in three sections, with two 
appendices supplying the background. In Section 2 below places the Chinese expansion 
in the context of world development. Section 3 then examines the characteristics of the 
Chinese economy further.  Section 4 offers a short list regarding what should be done to 
ease the transition caused by China's entry into the world market. Appendix A contains 
some quantitative measurements about Chinese growth.  Appendix B concerns the 
contextual approach used here. It is argued that like astronomy, another empirical but 
non-experimental discipline, economics has developed from isolated observations to 
large scale theory, thus afforded us a vantage point to investigate specific issues from 
general understanding.  
2. The Perspective of the World at Large 
The rapid expansion of the Chinese economy is an event significant for itself, and 
also for what it implies,  
Among all nations, Chinese growth brings opportunities to some and challenges to 
others. The low wage and large population of a rapidly expanding economy mark an 
event with special impact in both the short run and the long run. This fits the growth of 
China now, India soon, a resurgent Russia, an energized Brazil down the road, and 
perhaps also the Middle East and Sub-Sahara economies, to them, the Chinese success is 
likely a wake up call. Thus, this might be the beginning of the end of underdevelopment. 
Of course, the increase of total income is only the benign half of the coin in economic 
development, distributive justice is also important; The development process has both 
economic and also non-economic impact, on both human welfare and human survival.  
In all matters, the impact of an event depends upon its nature. The development of the 
Chinese economy since 1978 defies simplistic explanations, based on either the conventional wisdom in economics or various popular hypotheses. Six types of such 
theses are discussed below.  
First, from either the neoclassical or endogenous growth theory, high growth is 
associated with either high saving, or human capital formation, such as R. and D. But it is 
patently clear that the start of current Chinese growth spell owes little to the rise in the 
saving/income ratio, the tapping of foreign savings or the emergence of local technical 
innovation. For illustration, Chart 1 displays both the saving rate and the growth rate, and 
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Second, one may try to relate the Chinese growth to the traditional theory of gains 
from international trade. It is known however that although Chinese trade looms 
relatively large to GDP
1, since the value added share in Chinese trade is very modest, the  
gains from trade, conventionally defined, cannot really explain Chinese growth. 
Third, one may seek institutional explanations based on market efficiency. This is no 
trivial task either. True, without the 1978 reform, there would not be growth like in today 
for China. But, institutionally, from corporate governance to financial institutions to labor 
market, there is a world of difference between China and all other economies which had 
enjoyed 'miracle growth'. From West Germany under the Marshall Plan, to the Republic 
of Korea, after the Korean War, in each and every of these economies which enjoyed 
high growth, market force has played far larger roles compared against China. While 
market institutions have been gradually re-introduced in China, after 1978, high growth 
                                                 
1 In fact, the Chinese ratio exceeds that of Japan. in China had gone on before these, for substantial part of the post-1978 period. In that 
phase, market mechanism had played only modest roles in vast proportion of the 
economy. Even today, Chinese stock market and Chinese banking are still substantially 
different from what exists elsewhere. It will be placing the carriage before the horse to 
conclude that China has grown faster than many other developing economy, say, in Latin 
America, mainly because in China, market force has functioned more like in London or 
New York. 
Fourth, one can try to search recent Chinese history for explanations in the opposite 
direction, claiming that Chinese growth is due to the avoidance of market failures. But it 
is hard to argue that the current Chinese political institutions or the economic pre-
conditions of Chinese growth (such as the near total absence of any private ownership 
and the presence of the centrally planned system) are solely the 'right stuff' for today's 
sustained rapid growth. The economic record in East Europe and the formerly USSR 
economies, both before and after the passing of Communism clearly shows the difficulty 
of making such an argument. Further. there has been persistent criticism by Chinese 
officials and foreign observers against such situations in China today, like the huge loss 
of state owned enterprises (SOEs) and the Non-Performance Loans (NPLs) of Chinese 
state banks
2.    
Fifth, another way is to search for causes of growth in some initial conditions, like the  
low wage in China, which might favor exports. But this cannot be the sufficient reason to 
explain the performance of the Chinese economy. Bangladesh, Myanmar, North Korea 
and many Sub-Sahara African countries have wages even lower than China today, and 
their performance is clearly different from China. 
Finally, some may attribute high growth to the Chinese culture and ethos. However, 
these factors certainly cannot explain the difference in the growth record of the same 
China before the 1978 reform, and the period after it.   
But if without adaptation, the economic literature - in growth and trade as well as 
economic history and institutional economics - cannot adequately explain Chinese 
growth, the Chinese economic performance does have a great deal to offer to all these 
economic fields.  
                                                 
2 A convenient reference is  Woo (2002). To make a long story short, it is our view that what drives economic development is 
mostly technical progress, and in most economies, except the technology leader, this is a 
matter of the inward transfer of information (in technology and opportunities). In the last 
six decades, the transfer is largely a byproduct of trade and investment, as long as the 
history and institutions of the economy permit these to happen. 
This is the main mechanism which governs East Asian development. The case of 
Communist China is the exception proving this rule.  It also explains to some extent what 
happened in Europe. Before the German Unification, the lag of East Germany behind 
West Germany.  Judging from the recent economic development of China under 
Communism, this lag  of East Germany is perhaps more due to its isolation from the 
advanced economies (also to some extent, the rigidity of the planned economy) than 
anything else, ideology and political institutions included.  
Thus, by its nature, the Chinese growth is the latest phase of East Asian economic 
development, something dating back to the economic recovery of Japan during the 
Korean War, half a century ago. In turn, the development of East Asia also shares some 
though not all of the properties of the post-WWII recovery and growth of West Europe .  
In turn, the acceleration-then-deceleration of various economies in West Europe and East 
Asia, together with the rise-then-fall of the centrally planned economic systems (in New 
Delhi, Beijing, also Moscow) form the twin defining events in what is known as the 
American Century. Here the American hegemony by technology and globalized finance 
has replaced the British hegemony by gunboat under quintessential colonialism.   
Both West Europe and East Asia were ravaged by war in 1945, and lagged much 
behind America. Then both have recovered and prospered, utilizing waves and waves of 
new technology
3 developed in America 
4. In West Europe and East Asia, economy after 
economy had their spells of 'miracle growth', at rates much faster than the steady but 
prosaic American growth. Invariably, by the end of their 'high growth' period, they   
would have erased much of their proportional gap in per capita real income versus 
America. Yet, a recalcitrant residual gap remains, defying efforts for any further 
reduction. As a first approximation, the mechanism of such development may be 
                                                 
3  From antibiotics, to electronics to integrated circuits, the globally positioned satellites, (GPS) and the 
internet, to genetic and nano technology,  characterized as an axle-and-spokes model of interdependent growth. See Wan (2004) 
reported in the DEGIT IX Conference.  
In such a model,  America - as the 'axle' - serves as the incumbent technological 
leader.  For other  economies, the high growth period
5 represents a 'window' for intensive 
inward transfer of technology and practice. This is an interval when the capacity to 
absorb is high, but the technology backlog remains substantial. The process of 
technology transfer is a contact sport, accessible only to those open to foreign trade and 
investment. To wit, by combining with 'openness', the 1978 reform in China has 
succeeded to induce sustained rapid growth, while all earlier reform efforts failed. 
Institutionally and culturally, East Asia is very different from West Europe, with its 
historical ties to the incumbent hegemon. For developed countries in West Europe, trade 
among each other has intensified, forming a regional network, with the German economy 
at its core. In contrast, the growth of East Asia is shaped by the fact that in technology, 
Japan is more advanced than the Asian Newly Industrialized Economies (NIES), namely, 
Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, and these four are more advanced than 
Mainland China. This fact matters. It has produced an ever lengthening supply chain for 
America: Japan, the earliest member of the chain gravitates to produce high tech 
components, while China, the latest member joining the chain specializes in labor 
intensive production. 
Low wage may be the beginning of the East Asian advantage, but by no means its 
end. Focusing on economics and the technology driving the economics, economies in 
East Asia forged ahead with much single-mindedness. Thus, transistor radio was 
developed soon after the appearance of transistors. Cameras with view-finders came after 
the maturity of the optical sensor technology. The computer-numerically-controlled 
(CNC) machine tools arrived when micro computer became available. Digital watch 
swept the market when integrated circuits materialized. From Walkman, Camcorder and 
Nintendo to Sandisk memory, Japanese innovative product design is integrated 
seamlessly with American cutting edge technology.  Likewise, Korean fabrication 
                                                                                                                                                 
4 though some might have roots elsewhere 
5 if any technology in mass production makes that country a world leader in shipbuilding as well 
as memory computer chips, in spite of the rising domestic wage.  
East Asians also networked with each other for industry migration and product 
cycles.  Thus, it is Japan from East Asia which emerged as the world's second largest 
economy next to America, and it is Taiwan whose merchants made China the world's 
second largest exporter of information technology (IT) products, overtaking Japan. 
Likewise, Singapore and Hong Kong also alternate with each other as the world's largest 
container port and the most efficient harbor.   
To recapitulate, three points deserve notice. First, East Asians are not merely 
imitators. What has sustained their success is innovation. Initially, with low wage and 
strenuous effort in adaptation, East Asians gained the entrée into the markets of advanced 
economies, in comparison against Latin Americans, notwithstanding all the advantages of 
the latter, in both technical competence and cultural affinity
6. Next, close commercial 
association with America form the basis of East Asians in their innovative co-
development with the American economy, thus catching up with West Europe in their 
pace of economic growth. Second, so far, East Asian innovations remain dependent upon 
their close ties with America. Overtaking America is still not possible on a broad front, 
and not because of the lack of trying. The failure of Japan's Generation Five (G5) Project 
in information technology is symptomatic of this reality. Finally, on a per capita basis, 
East Asia is poor in natural resources. In contrast to other developing economies, this 
may be a blessing in disguise.  These societies focus attention to education and the 
acquisition of pragmatic skill, exporting manufactures for natural resources. Since 
learning on the manufacturing jobs is likely to be less product-specific, and the supply in 
educated workers had facilitated the upgrading of the industrial structure, these 
economies may have an easier time to adapt to market uncertainties, also to move up the 
product ladder.
7  
Within East Asia, where Confucianism forms the common cultural denominator, the 
Vietnamese, the Koreans, the Japanese and the Chinese differ from each other, in history 
                                                 
6 See the discussion by Morawetz (1981) 
7 Findlay and Wellisz (1993) related how well Hong Kong had adapted to the meteoric rise and fall of the 
wig industry and Cheng (2001) related how Taiwanese workers shifted relatively easily from the 
production or straw hats to produce footwear of higher value. and even more, in language: a division no less than what divides the Basque, the Magyar, 
and the Estonian from the English. Yet necessity is the mother of competence.  The 
Japanese general trading companies and the more traditional Overseas Chinese network 
function well in outsourcing. The recent rapid change of the world trade pattern 
represents more of the transfer of specific technology and institutional adjustment among 
East Asian economies than the change in factor endowment (including human capital) 
which dominates the conventional explanations in trade theory. In such transactions,   
trade in manufactured input is quantitatively a dominant component, also an 
indispensable catalyst for industrial migration. The rapid change of  sources for American 
footwear imports is nothing short of astounding. Within half a dozen years, the Chinese 
share went from single digit to nearly two thirds, as the Taiwanese share evaporated 
almost overnight, after the exchange rate appreciation in mid-1980s. The current 
expansion of the Chinese trade is a continuation of such patterns. 
In the shifting of the supply base and the trade in intermediate goods, the intra-East 
Asian division of labor resembles intra-national trade (for example, in America, with the 
migration of the textiles and the automobile industries to the American South from the 
Northeast and the Midwest states). This is the harbinger of the intra-China expansion of 
the export base that is currently happening.  
For historical perspective, we present Table 1 to highlight the performance and the 
challenges facing four different economies.  







Britain  58  years  1780-1838  As the technology leader, made 
progress only based on own R & D 
Japan  34  1885-1919  As a follower, but restricted by 
resource availability 
The Republic of  Korea  11  1988-1977 
China   9  1978-1987 
As a follower, unrestricted in 
resource under globalization 
See Wong (2002) 
 
3.  The 'Chinese Exceptionalism': the Low Wage and the Large Population 
The 'border effect' exists between America and Canada, as it is shown in the recent 
empirical studies in international trade. This reflects the fact that due to laws, regulations 
and human connection, and the channels via existing institutional hierarchies, the shift of 















Chart 3  A simplified picture   
 
 
























hat is why for the China trade, national size matters  in view of the low Chinese wage 
and the large Chinese population. Being 27 times as populous as South Korea (or ten 
times as Japan) the Chinese economy is not just another member, or just another 
collection of East Asian economies. In population at least, what China is to East Asia 
resembles what Russia is to the Slav peoples. And yet, for now, in value terms, the 
Chinese total income is only one quarter of that of the Japanese. That means, for the 
moment, extraordinarily low wages, and also extraordinarily low labor costs, provided 
Chinese productivity will rise.  Given the size of the Chinese population, that also means, 
the relative insensitivity of wage rate to export demand, and a sensitivity of the 
government to regional income polarization
8.   
                                                 
8 What caused China to call for developing the 'West Region' is the fact that there in 1998, 56% of China's 
area had 23% of the population, with only 15% of the income as well as the fixed assets, with just 3% of 
the export and foreign direct investment, and the gap with the coastal 'East Region' was widening. See Tina 
(2002). More recently, the development plan for the West  is postponed because of its cost.    To avoid massive internal migration, and the administrative stress that goes with it, 
the government would encourage local participation in the export trade, throughout the 
continental-sized nation. Thus the low Chinese wage is likely to endure. Hence, the 
surplus-labor theory of Lewis and Ranis and Fei regains its relevance, in a changed form. 
The situation, greatly simplified,  is shown in Chart 3. 
The Chinese trade expansion has a slow start, and hence a suddenness in its progress. 
This recent growth of Chinese export is to no small degree the result of internal 
reconfiguration of the Chinese export base, in geography and in ownership. Both are 
path-dependent, due to the special history of Chinese political economy.  
As China adopted market reform in 1978 in its major institutional and ideological 
reorientation, much stumbling blocks loomed ahead. The peril of reform is such that East 
European regimes lost power and Soviet Union imploded as a nation. Unfamiliar with the 
process, the Chinese leadership was cautious in its approach, holding back temporarily  
the reform in the lower Yantze delta
9, the Chinese industrial heartland, but allowed more 
experimentation in Guangdong, near Hong Kong. The false start in Hainan Island, and 
the misplaced attention paid to areas around the dysfunctional Macao have revealed 
amply both the utter lack of information of the Chinese decision makers, as well as the 
sagacity of their caution in, 'fording the river by feeling the stones'.  
It is only after the success of Shenzhen, an instant metropolis behind Hong Kong that 
the Chinese leaders signaled 'full court press' to develop Pudong, a mammoth industrial 
region adjacent to Shanghai, as the heart of the new expansion.  In population size, 
Guangdong alone is a province half again as large as Korea, and the equal of France plus 
Belgium. Yet , history has shown that in comparison, the lower Yantze delta has far 
outdistances Guangdong, in its proven industrial potential. 
But geographical progression is only part - perhaps the far easier part - of the detour 
in the Chinese strategy. Total state ownership was achieved at heavy cost under the 
leadership of Chairman Mao. The return of private businesses and foreign capitalist firms 
were expediencies initially difficult to comprehend by the mass of idealistic supporters of 
the State. They had sacrificed so much to bring about the status quo. Whatever their 
effectiveness, both the reform of large and middle sized state owned firms - still in 
                                                 
9 Especially Shanghai process without total success - and the introduction of the cooperative ('hybrid') form of 
the 'town and village industries' had been necessary steps in marketizing the economy. 
That difficult phase has been passed, along the earlier inflation, caused by overheating. 
With its low wage rate, it is no surprise that China has emerged as the favorite export 
platform of the world's multinational corporations (like WalMart), and hence as the 
workshop of the world.  Given the mechanism of learning-by-doing, Chinese productivity 
must rise, a boon to its trading partners and a bane to its competitors. 
The effects on other economies are of two kinds. The pressure for relocation of the 
present and the change of the prospect for the future. 
First, to more and more foreign producers, relocating to China becomes 'an offer one 
cannot refuse'. Given the lower transaction cost to relocate factories among culturally 
similar societies, first, to Hong Kong and Taiwan, then, to Singapore and the Pennang 
state, Malaysia, areas with heavy Chinese settlement, and next, to Korea and Japan, de-
industrialization becomes a threat. Competitive relocation becomes a Prisoners' Dilemma. 
The key is not the expected profit from a move, but the probable loss in staying and 
competing against rivals already made the move. Thus, in Hong Kong, the 900,000 
manufacturing jobs of the 1980s shrank to less than 200,000 today. But then, across the 
border, there are now more than 11 million Chinese workers in Hong Kong -connected 
factories. The combination of Hong Kong experience and Chinese labor cost is a grim 
prospect facing their competitors, elsewhere.  
Relocation is often thought of as a process of prosperity and rising wages, but the 
Crisis of 2001 proved otherwise. The risks and initial cost of relocation, usually avoided 
by firms in fair weather, might be braved in adversity, as a desperate gamble: once the 
alternative is sure oblivion. For those who survived and thrived, experience is gained 
once for all, and an intended temporary relocation may become a long term commitment,  
encouraging others still on the fence, once the bar of uncertainty is lowered. 
But the impact goes further. As the term 'China price' becomes a byword in the 
American market, those American firms who find it hard to relocate can lobby for 
temporary protection of their home turf. When the multi-fiber agreement (MFA) expired, 
foreign suppliers to America, from Lesotho and the Czech Republic, to the Dominican 
Republic are bereft of that option.  The industrially hollowed out Hong Kong can evolve into a destination for Chinese tourists nearby. The trend of de-industrialization may steer 
Taiwanese firms to use their Chinese connection in managing supplies for MNCs, rather 
than producing themselves. The options for African and Latin American manufacturers 
are less obvious. 
Among the enterprises, the pressure is directly imposed on the primary producer, but 
indirectly also on all supporting firms. For the employees, the young and qualified may 
be sent over with promotion, to care for the new undertaking, but the fate for the old and 
less trained is only redundancy. Income polarization thus develops among the workers. 
Secondly, as Chinese export expands, new orders may go to old rivals, re-orienting 
the pattern of specialization. In textbook terms, this change is entirely innocuous. But in 
real life this is not so
10.   
As  post-World War II history shows - technology transfer happens mostly from  
trading directly with the high income countries, the shift in trade routes is a matter of 
concern to discerning economists like the late Linsu Kim (2000). He deplored the loss of 
American market by Korea to China, shifting Korean export outlet  to China instead in 
goods, like steel. 
If the interest of an advanced mid-income country like Korea can be hurt due to the 
reconfiguration of trade, economies of lower industrial potential have even more reason 
to fear that their development opportunity may get pre-empted. 
Having surveyed the impact of Chinese trade expansion on other economies it is time 
to turn to the effect on China itself. 
It is important to note that what faces the world is neither the dawn of a 'Chinese 
Century', in place of the current American hegemony in technology and finance, nor an 
upheaval 'of the Chinese, by the Chinese and for the Chinese'. During the current wave of 
globalization, the economic juggernaut is a collection of multinational supply chains, in 
which the China serves only as a lowly-paid link. With some doing, China can even be 
entirely replaced with South Asians, or countries in the Middle East. The change of actors 
would change nothing essential in the plot. What brought on this new era is the 
impersonal force of international technology transfer. Backed by the pool of a large but 
                                                 
10 The above discussion goes beyond the axle-and-spokes model, since the 'spokes' interact with each other: 
one latecomer in industrialization may hinder another's path. poor  local purchasers, China has some bargaining power, to be sure, but not all that 
much: among the world's five billion relatively poor: enough others are waiting in the 
wings.  
The role of the Chinese leadership is at the most a facilitator, along with the MNCs, 
the high tech innovators and the world's financial institutions.  Globalization has brought 
huge consumers' surplus to buyers around the world, hefty profit to parties controlling 
certain strategic or cutting edge technology, as well as the owners of scarce natural 
resources. The gain of the Chinese working class is neither the lion's share, nor is it 
evenly distributed.  
One might scrutinize why China has achieved sustained rapid growth ahead of many 
other large developing countries. Relative to the others, for better or worse, the Chinese 
at the early 21st Century are less influenced by religion (when compared to the Islamic 
societies), by tradition (when compared to the Indians), and are available in larger 
numbers (as compared the Koreans, the Vietnamese)
11.  They also happen to have the 
right combination of literacy, health standard, and the social organization (as compared  
to Sub-Sahara Africa). They share enough cultural and historical connections with the 
other East Asians in Japan and the Newly Industrialized Economies (NIEs) who have 
previously served in similar roles on the supply chains (as compared to the Latin 
Americans). This is why the Chinese workers are advantageously positioned in joining 
the supply chains, to play the most visible roles
12. As a result, in common perception, 
China also enjoys the undeserved honor of posing the greatest economic threat. 
Truth be told, in the first place, from strategic planning to product design and 
marketing, much of the Chinese export is handled by firms outside of the Mainland. For 
example,  a main channel of the Chinese electronics exports is the firm Hong Hai from 
Taiwan. In the second place, a broad range of manufactured intermediate inputs is 
imported, from economies with far higher wages. For example, bicycles made in 
Dongguan contain much imported inputs from both Japan and Taiwan, and in value, 
either part exceeds the local content. Thirdly, although the two-way trade between 
America and China is heavily unbalanced against America, the over all balance of trade 
                                                 
11 needed to keep wage cost low for a long period  
12 though far from the most remunerative for China is more or less balanced. Within the past few years, China has become the 
largest export outlet for Hong Kong, Taiwan and Korea. This means China resembles a 
conduit to earn American dollars for other economies. See the testimony to the American 
Congress of Lawrence Lau (2003) in which it is further pointed out that the portion of 
value added earned by the Chinese is surprisingly meager. Finally, on supply chains, 
China is not only a late - comer in calendar time, but among late-comers, China also 
appears 'late in coming', counting from the principal economic reform which opens the 
economy to the outside world. Thus,  in the reform of 1958, Taiwan became open to 
world trade, without years ahead of the Chinese reform in 1978. By 1983, a quarter of a 
century later, Taiwanese firms like Evergreen and Acer already played significant 
worldwide roles in container shipping and personal computers. By 2003, a quarter of a 
century after its own 1978 reform, few firms from China, a far larger economy, had a 
position in their own industries, worldwide comparable to Evergreen and Acer, 20 years 
ago. From all these, objectively speaking, it is far too early to speculate whether and 
when would China ever take over the leadership role enjoyed by America now, and 
Britain in the past. 
Leave aside the relative ranking in the world and focus on the absolute position. The 
current situation is far from an unmixed blessing to China. From the macroeconomics 
angle, the pressure for job creation on the government is unrelenting. That explains the 
Chinese emphasis on export volume in lieu of the terms of trade, the real income, etc. 
This is so, even though China can never fully resolve the problem of under-employment 
by export expansion. This is why at a time when China attracts direct foreign investment 
which give their owners hefty profit margin, the government accumulates zealously huge 
foreign exchange reserves in such assets earning  for the Chinese scanty returns. 
It is arguable that there is enough dynamic trading gain from learning to justify the 
promotion of exports with tax rebates on imported inputs. But does it take to serve as 'the 
workshop of the world' just to gather information from exports?  Has the point of 
immiserizing growth been reached? There is little indication that these are questions of 
official concern.  
At the same time, these are trade issues which should be sensitive to the Chinese 
government, namely, income polarization, which has rightly attracted government attention in the interregional context.  Rightly or wrongly, it is speculated that Chinese 
rapid growth is related to world wide shortages in petroleum and certain nonferrous 
metal. Given the fact that petroleum price through its influence on transportation cost can 
have effect on the cost of living, causing immiserizing growth. Now, the presence of 
'surplus labor'  may reduce the upward flexibility of the money wages. When this is 
coupled with immiserizing growth, it would raise the 'inequality measure', affecting 
members among the working class by reducing the real wage income, perhaps even 
threaten to place workers below the poverty line. 
Given the operation of the world market, such questions can affect laborers elsewhere 
as well as in China, of course being at the center of the current globalization, the negative 
effect on Chinese labor can be equally significant on workers elsewhere.  
One can summarize the effect of Chinese growth on the Chinese economy in Chart 4, 
summarized in three blocks. Block A indicates how the reform, the devaluation (also the 
taming of the inflation) has triggered the growth. Block B indicates the expansion of 
trade, the inward flow of outside investment and the transfer of technology has made 
China 'the workshop of the world', a development seemingly resemble a machine of 
perpetual motion. Block C indicates the limit of growth which can affect China, with 
profound effect on the rest of the world also, in a way that the rapid expansion of Japan 
and the NIEs did not have to face in the past. 
In many ways, Block B represents the situation today, and the negative effects in 
Block C have not yet fully emerged. Of course, early countermeasures are important to 
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 The other issues are non-economic in nature, the pressure of industrialization on 
environment. It is known that fresh water fishery in the Yangtze delta - the pride of 
historical China for millennia - has been affected in recent decades. Acid rain has 
decimated forests locally as well as cross-border. The needs for energy has caused the use 
mining of coal in unsafe facilities, in the face of accidents after accidents. Fortunately, 
these questions have attracted official notice in China. 
Of course, the industrialization of China, with whatever imperfections, remains like 
some unattainable 'happy state' in poorer Asian lands. Moreover, unless coordinated 
international effort is made, efforts by China alone would not be of that much help. 
On a global scale, Plus ça change, et plus c’est la même chose. 
4. What is to Be Done? 
At this point, some general observations may be made.  
First, current Chinese growth is based on both the improvement in production 
technology and the intensified international division of labor. In itself, such 
development enlarges the world production potential and, in principle, can be 
beneficial to all parties in the long run.  
Second, what can cause harm is due to either the externality of environmental 
degradation, like global warming, which is detrimental to everyone, or such 
lopsided income redistribution which affects the welfare of the world's least 
fortunate, or else, a process of adjustment so turbulent that it may result in serious 
injury during the transition or social instability. These are genuine and serious 
concerns, not to be dismissed as protectionist sentiment of the few.   
Third, under globalized production, the present expansion of the Chinese export 
is in fact a collaborative undertaking, only with the last stage of fabrication taking 
place on Chinese soil. It may hurt the interest of some party but help others, in 
China as well as elsewhere.  
Fourth, more generally, the Chinese development is by now closely intertwined 
with other economies in the world. The acceleration of current expansion can cause 
serious dislocations, but any major reversal of the development in recent years is 
also likely to lead to equally deleterious to the interest of various parties throughout 
the world. Take America for instance, a shift of supply source away from China may mean some sharp price rises in large segments of consumers' spending, and the 
sales of the dollar assets held as reserves by the Chinese monetary authority would 
also be quite disruptive to American financial markets. 
Fifth, what is needed and what is likely to happen is coordinated  transition of 
trade patterns via international negotiation, among parties with economic power, 
rather than some formal supra-national forum, which is likely to be mired in 
gridlock. It would be far from fully efficient, but it may also head off both major 
economic upheavals and the stalling of economic progress.  
Sixth, contrary to textbook economics, there are mutually advantageous 
opportunities that are not pursued, due to market failure. International negotiation 
can potentially yield win-win solutions. 
Since China is likely to play major international roles, effort should be made to 
convince the Chinese, both the people and the authorities, that it is to their own interest in 
taking serious policy measures to restructure the economy. In particular, 
(a) Major job creation program must be undertaken to resolve the 'surplus labor' 
problem. Only then the country can avoid immiserizing growth.  
(b) High priorities have to be assigned to environment protection, resource 
conservation, and the generation of cleaner energy. Their importance is no less than the 
control of population. The future of economic growth depends on these initiatives.  
(c) 'Second stage import substitution' should be promoted, to reduce the dependence 
on manufactured inputs imported from economies with wage higher than China.  
In the longer run, internationally, Chinese must become richer clients, and also less 
bruising competitors. Appendix A  The PRC Economy 
 
1. Introduction 
The growth record of the PRC economy is very striking. As the most populous in the 
world, the economy of China is not only important for its own sake, it also forms a vital 
part of the world economy in this era of globalization. Its future performance is now 
critically intertwined with much of East and Southeast Asia. One the one hand, China is 
the largest export market to most of the NIEs. On the other, as the 'workshop of the 
world', the Chinese industries also form the critical links in the supply chains for much of 
the manufacturing imports of the developed world.  
Most writers maintain that the economic growth of the PRC has gone exceptionally 
well; a small minority would doubt the statistics. This paper tries to make comparison 
with the record of other economies, so we can draw conclusions more intelligently. 
Two simple comparisons come next. 
A. Comparison with India 
Figure 1 below plot the relative real per capita GDP of the PRC and India between 
1952 and 2000. The following points might be deduced. 
a) Both China and India had major economic reforms, in 1978 and 1991 respectively. 
b) When both countries were before their reforms, India dominated China. 
c) China had its reform earlier than India by 13 years, and China caught up with India 
in 1982, after the reform in China and before the reform in India. 
d) The 'openness' nature of the reform apparently matters: the adverse shock to the 
external relations of PRC after the Tiananmen Square Incident, India immediately closed 
the gap for a year or two. 
e) As the foreign investment record shows in Figure 2, China receives far more than 
India, and from Figure 3, the 'ethnic Chinese economies' of Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan 
and Singapore had played major roles in such investment. 
f) Figure 4 shows that in the period between 1960 to 1996, the ethnic Chinese 
economies have closed their gap in relative per capita real GDP from America at speeds 
higher than most economies, but the non-resident Indian economies like Fiji Islands 
Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad-Tobago, etc. have even seen their gap widened, some of the 
time. Even Mauritius had not done as well as the ethnic Chinese economies. 
g) This implies, to some extent, the migration of industries from these high-
performance ethnic Chinese economies to the PRC may have boosted the Chinese 
progress. For example, 11 million Chinese workers work in factories with Hong Kong 
investment, and 2/3 of Chinese electronics export today are from firms with Taiwanese 
investment. Figure 5 illustrates the influence of such industry migration from Taiwan to 
Chinese Mainland, as the change in the sources of American footwear imports. 
h) In the past, much of the FDI to PRC is from Hong Kong (which dominated the 
world market in textiles) and Taiwan (which has been prominent in electronics), but not 
from Korea, a major source of steel and ships. The PRC exports textiles and electronics 
but not steel nor ships. That pattern suggests 'foreign investment dependence'. 
i) Industry migration has its limit. The manufacturing jobs of Hong Kong fell from 
900,000 at the peak to 200,000 workers now. So the period of comparative advantage 






























































Figure 2  Volume of Direct Foreign Investnment 
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Figure 4 Reduction of gap in per capita real GDP from the US  1960-62 to 1966-68 
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   B. Comparison with Taiwan  
 
The major reform that led to economic growth happened in Taiwan in 1958 and in the 
PRC in 1978. One can ask that comparing the 'pace' of improvement , at a given number 
of years after the date of reform, either in the difference or in the ratio between their 
relative per capita real GDP. Both of these measures are shown in Figure 6. If this way of 
comparison is appropriate, then the PRC has not yet performed at the Taiwanese level, 20 
years earlier. 
A possible objection is that by starting at the lower level, one would not expect that 
the PRC can perform as well as Taiwan, at the earliest stage. 
In any case, the present situation shows a symbiotic economic relationship with 
Taiwan, with Taiwan gaining much as shown in Figure 7, also in a highly dependent 
situation. Not just with PRC serving as the largest export market (around 1/4) of Taiwan, 
but the PRC provides much foreign exchange income to Taiwan in a lop-sided 
relationship, which is unique and extreme for the PRC. Sooner or later, normal economic 
force, to say nothing caused by any possible future political alienation, would change 
this, as the PRC economy waxes stronger still and the Taiwanese economy becomes more 
dependent, with no visible sign of major diversification of trade nor upgrading of 
production pattern. 
At a time, that America placed great pressure for the PRC to balance bilateral trade, 
the overall trade of the PRC is largely balanced, except with huge import surplus toward 
Korea, Japan and Taiwan, with Taiwan being the extreme case, in both (import - export) 
and (export/import).  The foreign exchange flow is: 
    America  → The PRC → Taiwan 
and the consequence is the displacement of Japan by the PRC as the world's second 
largest exporter of information industry products (America first, Taiwan fourth, and 
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2. The Per Capita Real and the Nominal  GDP 
In comparison with both Taiwan and India, the growth record of the PRC is now quite 
understandable and credible, in both senses of that word. There is not likely much data 
problem, but nor is it incredibly outstanding. Reform came late, compared against Japan, 
Korea and Taiwan, but earlier than India and from a base lower than all, India included.  
The cultural affinity with the other ethnic Chinese economies has played a highly 
beneficial role.  
We must consider now the difference between the nominal and the real per capita 
GDP. On nominal terms, the PRC has an average income which is 1/20 of America. 
Adjusted by the purchasing power parity, the ratio is more like 10%.  There is a large 
difference in between. The real measure takes into account that for example, a haircut is a 
haircut, yielding the same satisfaction, even though due to labor cost, such items may be 
far more expensive in a richer country, according to the Balassa-Samuelson version of the 
so-called Penn Effect. For higher income countries, higher wage, hence wage would 
bring the nominal closer to the real.  
One can see how the above explanation fits well among seven Asian economies with 
2002 data, in Figure 8. The effect of a low wage for India and PRC is obvious. 
Although the growth rate of the PRC has stayed much higher than America (like the 
case of India), to catch up with America on per capita terms would take several life times, 
at the present pace, let alone the fact that such a pace may not be sustainable. 
But as all economies gradually catch up with the United States, do their relative 
wages catch up, and hence the Penn effect becomes less pronounced? Figure 9 shows a 
complex picture: yes for Japan, Hong Kong and Korea; no for Malaysia and Singapore, 
because of terms of trade effects; emphatically no, for India and China. Figure 10 would 
focus on the data of PRC in detail. Early years one may be seeing an over-valued RMB, 
but subsequent stationarity of the ratio must mean that even though there is rapid 
productivity gain, the 'real wage' by and large has not gone up sufficiently to make a 
difference, in the half a dozen years, 1996-2002. In particular, the pattern is starkly   
different from either Korea or Japan.  








































































 3. Chinese 'Exceptionalism'  
 
In many ways, the Chinese economy behaves distinctively differently from other 
economies in the world, in particular, its neighbors nearby, including the following seven 
aspects. 
(a) As it has been long observed that the less developed is an economy, then 
proportionately, the more its real per capita income exceeds its nominal per capita 
income. This phenomenon, under the name Penn Effect has been explained in 
different ways. In any case, by any of such reasoning, when an economy develops, 
the two measures of per capita income must tend to converge.  But for PRC the ratio 
between these two measures are farther and farther from unity. By the Penn effect 
alone, this should happen if the Chinese economy had stagnant or negative growth. 
But  in fact, the PRC economy has grown faster than most of the other economies in 
the world. 
 
(b) From the launching of manned spaceships and the sequencing of the silkworm 
genome, to the number of scientists and engineers trained every year, Chinese science 
and technology does not seem to be all that backward. Yet, in both nominal and real 
per capita income, the PRC is so low that even at its present phenomenal growth rate, 
it will still take centuries to catch up with Japan or America.  
 
(c) Yet, if growth potential depends on per capita income, no other economies at the 
level of per capita income as the PRC has ever had a rapid growth. 
  
(d)  Unlike Japan and Korea which promote strategic industries by granting directed 
credit to local firms, the Chinese government banks give most loans to state 
enterprises, which contributed relatively little to growth.  
 
(e) Again unlike Japan or Korea which hesitated to allow foreigners making 
investment as equity holders in their early stage of development, PRC offers tax 
holidays etc. to attract foreign investors.  
 
(f) It is equally unusual that the PRC has not only attracted more foreign capital than 
any other country, but such invested capital usually come as foreign direct 
investment, in rather small scale, and not very profitable.  
 
(g) The Chinese trade pattern also defies expectations. The PRC enjoys comparative 
advantage in both the low skill goods of shoes and garments and the high skill 
products like electronics. Yet, China also imports both primary products as well as 
goods from industries enjoying scale economy, like steel.  Appendix B The Contexual Approach 
 
The evolution of economic studies may be compared with astronomy, an empirical 
discipline with few opportunities for experiments. As understanding deepened, the field 
advances from isolated observations to over-all structure and dynamics. Without 
attempting a model-for-everything, theoretical development can already been applied to 
practical applications 




15, to ever broader assemblages: the solar systems, the galaxies, groups, 
clusters, the large scale structure and the expanding cosmos. Exceptional events like the 
supernova and the comet observed by Tycho Brahe, contribute to the discovery of  
regularities and invariants in the field. The practical benefits go from the environment 
preservation to protection against in-coming asteroids.  
The evolution of economics takes a similar course, from the studies of an agent (e.g. 
the Gossen's observation), an industry (e. g., the 'flying geese' pattern), and an individual 
economy (e.g., the turnpike theorem), to the formulation of various hypotheses on the 
world wide income distribution.  Building blocks set down earlier pave the way for 
advances toward the grand synthesis. Better understanding means better strategies against 
poverty and inequality.  
Thus, by the observation of Gossen, time is needed for consumption, but consumers 
have limited time, so ever newer goods appear in ever richer societies, with ever more 
time-saving designs. By the 'flying geese' scenario of Akamatsu, the catching up process 
of typical economies cause the representative industries to go through life cycles: from 
the emergence phase of import substitution, to the blooming phase of self-sufficiency - 
then -export, to the ultimate phase of decline. By the turnpike theorem, an economy 
moves toward a time horizon,  approaching some  asymptotic, constant growth rate. By 
the  hypothesis of relative convergence, member economies in convergence clubs evolve 
along adjacent growth paths. For the worldwide income distribution, indications suggest 
a gravitation toward some twin-peak pattern.  
The world economy of the last 60 years can be recognized as the dawn of a new 
epoch, with unending waves of new products and technology arrive at an unprecedented 
pace. The exceptional episodes of sustained rapid growth in East Asia herald the 
emergence of an interdependent world.  As a first approximation, the law of motion is 
captured in an axle-and-spokes model. Extending the theme in Wan (2004), a model by 
Clemhout and Wan (2005) is now built to integrate with the framework the conventional 
theory of growth
16. 
Using such an approach, the period 1945-2005 marks a new epoch.  There is 
profound and ceaseless change: vital technical progress, in medicine, micro-electronics, 
and informational technology, is coupled with the expansion of the fully developed 
societies, from the North Atlantic and Australia into the Asian - Pacific littoral.  There are 
                                                 
13 the Moon 
14 the Sun 
15 Jupiter, Venus, etc. 
16 Kuznets (1982) had sketched out the idea of such a theory in literal terms. Gomulka (1990) approached 
the catching up issue from empirircal angle. The identification of America alone as the axle, and the full 
development of an analytic theory are done in Wan (2004) and  Clemhout and Wan (2005(  also patterns reflecting remarkable stasis: within the 'American century' centered on 
technological advantage: American per capita real income, measured in purchasing 
power parity, leads most other economies, most of the time; American economy grows at 
a steady trendless rate, over the entire period. Ironically, the spectacular episodes of 
sustained rapid growth in East Asia serve to dramatize two characteristics, both measured 
against America: 
(a) There is a period of high growth, often hailed as a miracle, which lasts a for some 
interval, with the growth rate falling invariably then toward the American rate. 
(b) Compared against America, the proportional gap in per capita income would first 
reduce by some significant degrees, but then settle down to some irreducible residue.  
In truth, (a) and (b) form a 'common pattern' shared also by various West European 
economies during their earlier phases of high growth, under the Marshall Plan, soon after 
the Second World War.  
What is remarkable is not just the eventual tapering off of the growth paths of these 
formerly miracle economies (in West Europe or East Asia), but (i) all of them slow down 
to average growth rates not far from that of America, and (ii) each of them leaves a 
residual proportional gap from the American path, which is resistant to further reduction. 
It is striking that (iii) this 'common pattern' is not restricted only to economies of a 
certain location, or with a certain market size, or pursuing either laissez faire or active 
industrial policy, also (iv) nor does the high growth period occur at any particular period 
in calendar time, or to economies with a particular level of per capita income, measured 
in either absolute terms or as a proportion to the American level.   
Additional, but somewhat fragmentary information may also be stated. The onset of 
sustained rapid growth is often spearheaded by deregulation for foreign exchange and 
investment, as well as export promotion. This leads to the inter-connected growth of 
production and export, in a trading world, with America at its core.  
Finally, from the over all perspective, catching-up (with America) is far from a 
common behavior shared by all economies in the world, during this period.  Less than a 
third of the economies in the world have managed to reduce their proportional gaps in per 
capita real income against America within the 36 years between 1960 and 1996.  
Depending upon how events are characterized, one may even argue that over the 
entire world, income distribution is more polarized. For the per capita real income 
relative to America, the 'twin-peak' view may be augmented into the following scheme: 
1) There is America, standing out alone like a pinnacle 
2) There is a group of economies, less than half in number, but possibly more in 
population, gravitating slowly toward a zone distinctly below America, and 
3) There are economies in the rest of the world - whether there may or may not be any 
absolute growth in per capita real income - are facing widening gaps between themselves 
and America. 
Now quantitatively, the speed of catching up by any technology follower may depend 
upon the nature and pattern of the trade. Yet there are trade patterns and trade patterns, 
some favors one follower, some the other. Countries compete against each other in 
deciding which pattern prevails. In the axle and spokes model, this means spokes 
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